Marx1337 Identity Reveal: Unmasking the Operator Behind SMS Gateway Data Sales

Marx1337

Marx is a high-volume database and access broker whose core product is resold SMS gateway logs, not breaches of the brands named in them. He posts as Marx on DarkForums and as Marx1337 on XSS, with 76 DarkForums threads dated 20 September to 17 November 2026. The operation traces back to an earlier identity, Machine1337, registered on XSS in January 2024. The catalog shows a clear tiering:

  1. SMS gateway log slices relabeled with global brand names (banking, travel, retail, technology and crypto), sold per dataset and priced by record count.
  2. Regional SMS log slices with readable message content, including transaction alerts and one-time passcodes, concentrated in the Gulf and India.
  3. Non-SMS database sales, added since late October: business leads, customer records, gaming credentials, identity documents and healthcare directories, sold as flat files.
  4. Panel access sales and free teasers: admin panels in finance and logistics, plus free samples that promote larger collections.

The mix of sectors and countries indicates that Marx’s objective is monetizing data and access, not targeting any organization, sector or region. Most listings are one data type, delivery receipts sliced by sender-ID and relabeled with brand names. The sample timestamps range from November 2023 to October 2026, which points to a source with long retention that also carries current traffic.

The volume and variety also suggest that Marx did not obtain everything himself. His own advert offers “live-traffic access through third-party SMS providers”, and the acquisition path and authorization status are not confirmed. What the evidence does establish is who stands behind the brand’s Telegram contact: an OSINT trail from that account leads, with high confidence, to a named person in Ben Arous, Tunisia.

What Marx Actually Sells

The company names in Marx’s listings (HSBC, Samsung, PayPal) point readers in the wrong direction. He does not sell those companies’ customer databases. He sells slices of SMS gateway logs, and a typical listing is one sender name, on one route, to one country.

How a log becomes a listing

When a bank or an app sends a code by text, an SMS gateway delivers it and logs the sender name, the phone number, the country, the route, the time and the price. Marx describes his offer the same way: in an advert on 10 October 2026 he says the traffic he can provide depends on “the provider, destination, and service”. A listing is the log filtered by those three. Figure 1 shows Database AlSalamBank +18M.

The DarkForums thread of the Database AlSalamBank +18M listing, with the first rows of its sample
Figure 1. Database AlSalamBank +18M (DarkForums thread 104128, 19 October 2026).

In the first row, the route (the Username column) is Omantn, the sender name is AlSalamBank, the number belongs to the Seychelles, and the text is a card payment alert. The +18M is the row count Marx claims.

Most listings are built this way. In 39 of the 52 listings whose samples hold at least 20 rows, nearly every row (98 percent or more) has the same route, the same sender name and the same country.

Why these are logs and not company databases

The Talabat listing shows it. Of the 253 rows in its sample, 250 are receipts from a supermarket chain, Tamimi Markets, addressed to “TALABAT CUSTOMER” (Figure 2). The sender name is WTECH, not Talabat, and WTECH is also behind the Tamimi Markets and VasyERP listings. The brand on a listing is Marx’s label for a slice of traffic, not the source of the data.

The DarkForums thread of the Database TALABAT +4M listing, with rows from a supermarket chain
Figure 2. Database TALABAT +4M (DarkForums thread 101733, 15 October 2026). The sender is WTECH and the text comes from Tamimi Markets.

The files are not those companies’ customer databases. Whether the companies themselves were breached is a separate question, and nothing here answers it. Most listings are a cut of traffic with one country attached, so the next question is who sits inside those cuts.

Where the Recipients Are

Most listings are a cut of messages sent to one country, so the listings together map the people whose texts are in Marx’s files. We call them recipients. Their phone numbers are exposed, and in some files so are the texts: receipts, delivery notices, card payment alerts and one-time codes.

The company’s home says nothing

Samsung is South Korean, yet its listing holds Bahraini numbers (Figure 3). HSBC, PayPal, Google, Airbnb and Booking.com all point to Oman. A listing follows the route and the country, not the company’s head office.

The DarkForums thread of the Database Samsung +117M listing, with Bahraini phone numbers and networks in its sample
Figure 3. Database Samsung +117M (DarkForums thread 93301, 5 October 2026). The sample holds Bahraini numbers on the Bahraini networks Batelco, Zain and STC.

The map

Of the 76 threads, 56 are listings with a sample we could place on a map. Grouped by the country of most of their sample numbers, 39 of those 56 point at the Gulf (20 at the UAE alone), 7 at South Asia and 10 elsewhere (Figure 4).

Listings by country of the recipients

CountryListings
United Arab Emirates20
India6
Qatar6
Oman5
Bahrain5
Kuwait3
Egypt2

Figure 4. Countries with at least two listings. The other 20 threads could not be placed on the map: they sell databases or panels, are free posts, or have no usable sample.

The map is also getting wider. The first listings, from 29 September to 13 October, point at the Gulf, India, Nepal, Japan, the Philippines and Australia. From 15 October they add Egypt, Nigeria, Colombia, Singapore and the Seychelles. A wider map means more routes, and more routes means more traffic that Marx can see.

Where the Logs Come From

Some messages carry the provider’s fingerprint. Many contain a short link on m.9m.io, the link shortener of MSG91, an Indian SMS platform, and on many rows the sender name is WMSG91, which carries the same name. Figure 5 shows both in the SkinKraft sample, where the text sends the customer to an m.9m.io link.

The SkinKraft sample on DarkForums, with sender names WMSG91 and WTECH and a link on m.9m.io
Figure 5. Database SkinKraft +3M (DarkForums thread 93157, 4 October 2026).

Six listings carry these links (SkinKraft, Astroyogi, fragrantsouq.com, SalaryBox, qudify.co and HeyDude), all on the two globalmsg routes. The routes fall into three groups and one outlier:

  • globalmsgintl and globalmsglocal1 (31 of the 52 listings with at least 20 sample rows): MSG91, as the links show.
  • Omantn and OmantVPN (10 listings): traffic to Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, Lebanon and the Seychelles, under names from HSBC and PayPal to AlSalamBank. The route name resembles Omantel’s, Oman’s main operator.
  • mopletintl, Vfirst, Monty and VFT_DIR (10 listings): names that look like other providers’, and Vfirst matches the Indian company ValueFirst.
  • transfast (1 listing): a route named after the brand it carries, the Transfast listing, which fits a client account on a gateway.

Whatever the upstream, SMS logs stopped being Marx’s only product in late October.

Beyond SMS

Marx’s last SMS listing is dated 20 October. He started no new thread until 29 October, and the 12 threads from 29 October to 17 November come without an SMS sample. One of them offers a panel for the ocean freight service of DHL Global Forwarding (Figure 6). His own screenshot reads “Showing 1-50 of 17465 results”, the number in the title, with the booking details partly blacked out by Marx himself. It is the second panel he has offered, after a finance-management panel on 30 October.

The panel offered in the DHL Global Ocean thread, showing 17465 bookings
Figure 6. Panel – DHL Global Ocean +17465 (DarkForums thread 123140, early November 2026).

His sales method is the same as before: prices by volume ($250 for 250K lines up to $800 for 1M), free teasers locked behind a reply, and 152 follow-ups from his own account, mostly bumps such as “Still for sale”. When a link dies, as in his Transfast thread, he says he will post the file on Telegram.

Marx Is Machine1337

Two accounts, one seller

Marx has two forum accounts: Marx on DarkForums (76 threads, 233 posts) and Marx1337 on XSS (95 messages, seller rank, active today). Both were registered on 6 September 2026, both post the same datasets under near-identical titles, and both signatures end with the same line, “On the forum or via Telegram : Marx1337”.

The Marx1337 profile card on XSS, joined 6 September 2026
Figure 7. Marx1337 on XSS, joined 6 September 2026.

The Telegram channel

The signature points to Telegram. Marx’s channel, t.me/Marx1337, holds a single welcome message (Figure 8). Its Main Cloud link leads to a channel called Live Traffic, where Marx posts his sales, and the only contact it names is @Marx17. The two forum accounts and these two channels were all created on 6 September 2026: a full brand launched in one day.

The Marx News channel on Telegram, with the welcome message and the contact @Marx17
Figure 8. The welcome message of t.me/Marx1337, in a channel created on 6 September 2026.

The older name

@Marx17 was the only name in the message, so we used it as a pivot, which means a search that starts from one detail and leads to the next. We ran it through DeXpose, an OSINT (open-source intelligence) tool that searches Telegram’s public indexes, and it surfaced in the bios of two older assets that are still live: a group called Machine1337 (March 2025, 287 members) and a channel called Machine1337 (May 2025, 888 subscribers). Both bios read “The biggest traffic in the market! To Buy Private. @Marx17”, a slogan close to Marx’s own signature (Figure 9).

@Marx17 in the Machine1337 group bio@Marx17 in the Machine1337 channel bio
Figure 9. @Marx17 in the bios of the Machine1337 group (left, 287 members) and channel (right, 888 subscribers).

A bio can name anyone, so the group’s history is the stronger evidence. The group has been linked to two channels in turn, and linking takes admin rights over both. In 2025 it carried Live traffic – M13, which promoted Machine1337’s XSS listings (Figure 10). Today it carries Live Traffic, the Main Cloud channel from Marx’s welcome message (Figure 11).

The Machine1337 group on 5 June 2025, with a post from Live traffic - M13The Live traffic - M13 channel, 198 subscribers
Figure 10. Left: the group on 5 June 2025, with a Live traffic – M13 post promoting a Machine1337 listing. Right: the Live traffic – M13 channel (198 subscribers).
The Machine1337 group on 17 October 2026, with a post from the channel Live Traffic
Figure 11. The same group on 17 October 2026, carrying a post from Live Traffic.

Machine1337 was also a seller on XSS, registered on 18 January 2024 and banned on 17 July 2025 (Figure 12). Its Telegram channel, created on 13 May 2025, pins a forward of one of that account’s own listings, and the forwarded card shows the same registration date (Figure 13).

The Machine1337 account on XSS: banned, joined 18 January 2024
Figure 12. The Machine1337 account on XSS: joined 18 January 2024, banned 17 July 2025.
The Machine1337 channel: created 13 May 2025, with a pinned forward of the account's XSS listing
Figure 13. The Machine1337 channel, created on 13 May 2025, with its pinned forward.

On 8 September 2026, two days after the Marx launch, the Machine1337 channel forwarded two posts of t.me/Marx1337 and pinned one of them (Figure 14). Only admins can post in a channel, so the old channel’s admin is promoting the new brand.

The Machine1337 channel on 7 and 8 September 2026, forwarding and pinning posts of t.me/Marx1337
Figure 14. The Machine1337 channel on 7 and 8 September 2026, forwarding and pinning posts of t.me/Marx1337.

The same hands control Machine1337’s group and channel and Marx’s channel. We assess with high confidence that Machine1337 and Marx are the same operator, active since 2024.

From a Telegram Handle to a Name

Brands are cheap to rebuild, but the personal details behind them rarely change: a phone number, an email address, a nickname, a face. We started from the one person-level detail in Marx’s welcome message, the contact @Marx17, and pivoted from it across Telegram metadata, caller-ID intelligence, breach data, WhatsApp, social networks and photo geolocation. Every pivot gave us a new lead, and every lead was checked against a second, independent source before we relied on it.

The handle leads to a Tunisian phone

A Telegram username can be changed at any time, but the numeric ID behind it cannot. We took the ID of @Marx17 and ran it through the DeXpose Telegram Contact Info tool, which returns the phone number tied to an account together with its past usernames (Figure 15). The record is stable and gives us two things: a Tunisian phone number (+21651████91) and an earlier username, @ty2███0, that already carries a nickname.

DeXpose Telegram Contact Info for the Telegram ID of @Marx17, with a Tunisian phone number and a past username
Figure 15. DeXpose Telegram Contact Info for the Telegram ID of @Marx17.

What the phone number opens

Phone numbers are the glue of online identities, because people register accounts with them and forget. We ran this one through DeXpose Caller Intelligence, which returned the caller-ID name Ty La and a cluster of accounts registered with the number: WhatsApp, Instagram (0x███a), Discord (ty████15, created on 29 April 2022), Botim (registered in Tunisia), Snapchat (gr████12) and a PayPal account tagged France (Figure 16).

DeXpose Caller Intelligence for the phone, with the linked WhatsApp, Instagram, Discord, Botim, Snapchat and PayPal accounts
Figure 16. DeXpose Caller Intelligence for the phone.

One nickname, written ty, tyla or Tila, runs through all of them, from the old Telegram username to the Snapchat name. Six sources agree on the same nickname and the same country, which is hard to explain as a coincidence in a single dataset. The Instagram account shows the display name M████████i, our first sight of his given names. The PayPal account sits under a different first name but, as we show below, the same surname. It is tagged France and most likely belongs to a relative. It is our first French link.

The phone in public breaches

The next pivot was the phone number itself, searched in public breaches. The trail led to the divour diamonds breach, a customer record of an online shop, and that record gave us a Gmail address built on the same nickname (nf████la@gmail.com). Expanding the address in the DeXpose graph, which connects every record that mentions it, gave us the rest (Figure 17):

  • the name M█████d A█i, confirmed by three separate sources, with Tunisia as the country;
  • a Tunisian IP address, 197.25.16█.███;
  • a billing record under the name H█████i m████m, with a partly hidden phone number that is not his and a French address in Ivry-sur-Seine, street partly masked.
The DeXpose graph around the phone and the email, with the divour diamonds record
Figure 17. The DeXpose graph around the phone and the email, with the divour diamonds record.

The billing record is messy: it files the French commune under a Brazilian state. We therefore use it for what it carries reliably, the surname and the country, and not for the street.

A face and a travel log

The same phone number also resolves to a WhatsApp account, and we pulled its public profile photo. Geolocating the photo (GEOSINT) places it in Milan. The glass and iron vault, the mosaic floor and the Louis Vuitton boutique are those of the Galleria Vittorio Emanuele II, and the Swarovski Christmas tree in front dates the photo to a holiday season (Figure 18).

The WhatsApp profile photo, taken in the Galleria Vittorio Emanuele II in Milan in front of a Christmas tree
Figure 18. The WhatsApp profile photo of the phone, geolocated to the Galleria Vittorio Emanuele II in Milan.

His Instagram account tells the same story (Figure 19). It has 15 posts and 20.4K followers, and its bio is a plane emoji followed by 17 country flags. It reads as a travel log. France is one of them, and the profile photo was taken in front of the Eiffel Tower, so the account itself shows that he has been to France. Seven of the countries are in the Schengen area, which Tunisian passport holders normally need a visa to enter, so the list points to Schengen visas or to a residence permit, and that fits the French records we have already seen.

His Instagram profile, with a bio of a plane emoji and 17 country flags
Figure 19. His Instagram profile. The bio is a plane emoji and 17 country flags, shown here as country codes.

LinkedIn joins the name

Email addresses are strong leads because people use them to register everything. The DeXpose email lookup returns the identifiers associated with the address (Figure 20): a LinkedIn profile ID (m█████d-a█i-h█████i-b73███278), a Google account ID, a PayPal country (France) and Facebook account-recovery hints, a phone ending in 91 and a name starting with M and A. The hints come from yet another platform, and they agree with both the phone and the name.

The DeXpose email lookup, with the LinkedIn profile ID, the PayPal country and the Facebook recovery hints
Figure 20. The DeXpose email lookup, with the LinkedIn profile ID.

OSINT on the email took us to his LinkedIn profile (Figure 21). It reads M█████d A█i H█████i, Ben Arous, Tunisia, and it joins the given names and the surname that had only appeared apart in the earlier records.

The LinkedIn profile tied to the email, in Ben Arous, with the headline 2096 chez Software highlighted
Figure 21. The LinkedIn profile tied to the email. The headline is highlighted.

The headline is the best lead of the investigation. Most people write a job title there. His reads “2096 chez Software”, a job-title format filled with a postal code. 2096 is a Tunisian postal code in the Ben Arous area, so the profile handed us something a breach record rarely gives for free: a precise, self-declared location.

From a postal code to a second phone

We used the postal code the way an analyst uses any search detail, as a filter. We searched the breaches held by DeXpose for the full name together with 2096, and it returned a record from the StockX breach with the same name, a phone number and an address under that postal code, street partly masked.

Because the name and the postal code both came from the LinkedIn page, we did not take the match on trust. We tested it in three steps:

  1. The phone in the StockX record is a second number (+21624████93). It appears in another leak, VK Phone 2025, tied to a VK account (37█████23), and the VK profile photo shows the same man as the WhatsApp photo from the first phone.
  2. The second phone leads to an email. Its Caller Intelligence record returns an iCloud address (ha████la@icloud.com).
  3. The iCloud address leads to a third record. Searching it in the breaches returns RaffaelloTies.com, with the same name and the same address as the StockX record, and a Tunisian IP address, as the graph shows (Figure 22).
The DeXpose graph around the second phone number, with the StockX, VK Phone 2025 and RaffaelloTies records and the VK profile photo
Figure 22. The DeXpose graph around the second phone number, with the StockX, VK Phone 2025 and RaffaelloTies records.

Two leaks from different datasets, from 2018 and 2019, now agree on the name, the street and the postal code.

Two phones, one man

The two phone numbers connect the online and real-world sides of the same identity. The first, recovered through Telegram, links @Marx17 to a network of nickname-based accounts and breach records naming M█████d A█i in Tunisia. The second, found in the StockX record, connects to a full name, an address in Ben Arous, an iCloud email and a VK profile. The strongest link between the two is the matching face in the WhatsApp and VK profile photos, supported by the matching name and location.

Taken together, the LinkedIn profile, both Tunisian phone numbers, the IP addresses and the records placing him in Ben Arous point consistently to Tunisia as his origin. France appears as well: the PayPal account and the billing record carry his surname under other first names, most likely relatives, and his Instagram profile shows that he has been there, so he may live in France. We assess with high confidence that the person behind @Marx17, the contact used by both Marx and Machine1337, is M█████d A█i H█████i from Ben Arous, Tunisia. This assessment rests on multiple independent records that converge on the same identity.

The Old Handle Leads to the Same Place

We searched the username machine1337 in the public breaches and reached a record from the BreachForums (BF) leak: the email ham█████eni@gmail.com and the IP address 102.███.███.179. The IP is Tunisian (Figure 23).

The DeXpose graph for the machine1337 handle, with Marx as the root and the BF forum email and registration IP linked to the handle
Figure 23. The DeXpose graph for the machine1337 handle. Marx is the root, the old handle hangs from it, and the BF forum email and the registration IP hang from the handle.

The graph also shows the old channel link, t.me/Machine1337, in a message of a Telegram chat named Shiny Hunters.

What lines up with the first trail

Two things line up.

The country. The first trail landed in Tunisia too: the phone number (+216), the IP address of the first email and the LinkedIn location in Ben Arous. The two trails started from different handles and ended in different datasets, and both point to the same country.

The name. The email begins with “ham”, and the surname resolved in the first trail is H█████i. Hamma is also a given name in Tunisia, so we count this as a hint and not as proof.

Attribution Assessment

The report followed four threads: what Marx sells, where the brand comes from, who is behind it and how the old identity fits. This section puts them together, with a confidence level for each judgment.

Our assessments

  • High: Marx sells resold SMS gateway logs, not breaches of the brands named in them. Most listings are a cut of gateway traffic by sender name, route and country, and the messages carry the fingerprints of an SMS provider.
  • High for the globalmsg routes, medium for the rest: the traffic comes from third-party SMS providers. Links on the MSG91 shortener tie the two globalmsg routes, which carry most of his listings, to MSG91. The Omantn and Indian routes only match provider names.
  • High: Marx and Machine1337 are the same operator, active since 2024. One Telegram group carried both brands, the old channel promoted the new one two days after the launch, and the old handle’s own registration points to the same country.
  • High: the person behind @Marx17 is M█████d A█i H█████i, from Ben Arous, Tunisia. The phone, the nickname accounts, the email and the LinkedIn profile come from independent sources and agree, and the face ties the online persona to the named man.
  • Medium-high: that person runs both brands. @Marx17 is the only contact named by Marx and by the Machine1337 assets, and the BF forum record of the old handle points to the same country and to a name that begins like his.
  • Medium-high: he has family ties to France and may live there. A PayPal account and a billing record carry his surname under other first names, and his Instagram profile shows that he has been to France.
  • Not assessed: how Marx obtains the logs, whether he is authorized to sell them, and whether he lives in Tunisia or in France today. The address records date from 2018 and 2019.

Marx is not a new brand but the latest name of an operator active since 2024, who resells slices of SMS gateway traffic under the names of well-known brands.

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